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It is a truth universally acknowledged that male law students tend
to outperform female law students. Studies have indicated that men re-
ceive better grades than women at many law schools, 2 and that men
• Andrea Kayne Kaufman, B.A. Vassar College, Ed. M. Harvard University, J.D. Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, is the Executive Director of the Family Law
Center at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, Illinois. The author ac-
knowledges Blake Culver, Anne Wall, Hebet Valdes, Gina Synair, and Karah Kohler
for their outstanding research assistance. The author also acknowledges colleagues
Mary Becker, Maureen Collins, Jim Colliton, Meggan Duffy, Teree Foster, Wayne
Lewis, Jane Rutherford, Ruta Stropus, and Mark Weber for their generous support.
I. With apologies, the phrase "It is a truth universally acknowledged" is borrowed from
one of England's greatest female writers. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 1
(Random House 1995) (1813).
2. See LANi GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAw SCHOOL, AND IN-
STITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997). In their seminal study of University of Pennsylvania
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have reported more satisfaction and comfort with law school than
women.
Conservatives4 and feminists and everyone in between have pro-
posed different explanations for the disturbing phenomenon of men
feeling more comfortable in law school. Many blame the patriarchal na-
5 6ture of legal education that may isolate,' mute, and subordinate women
from the academy.7 Others suggest that women and men have different
learning preferences8 and that the male learning preferences are more
Law School students, the authors describe that although "men and women enter with
virtually equivalent statistics, men receive, on average, significantly better grades by
the end of year one." The authors note that men "maintain this advantage through
graduation; that is, the gender difference for mean GPA is stable across the three
years in the law school." The authors found that "women receive relatively lower
grades, achieve lower class ranks, and earn fewer honors than do men." GUINIER ET
AL., supra, at 37-38. See also Allison L. Bowers, Women at The University of Texas
School ofLaw: A Callfor Action, 9 Tax. J. WOMEN & L. 117, 139 (2000) (finding a
similar statistical differential in a study of law students at the University of Texas). See
also Morrison Torrey et al., What Every First-Year Female Law Student Should Know,
7 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 267, 287-88 (1998) (describing the Boalt Hall study in
which "two-thirds of all women thought that their grades did not fairly evaluate their
abilities or the time they spent studying... Not surprisingly.., a majority of men
expressed satisfaction with their academic performance"). See also Suzanne Homer &
Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law
School 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9-10 (1989) (citing the Yale Study which found
that the content of legal education "devalues factors important to women, such as so-
cial context, plurality of interests, or circumstantial and/or economic justification for
people's actions").
3. Torrey et al., supra note 2, at 287-88.
4. See generally Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
FOUNDATIONS 99-117 (1993)(Posner describes how various scholars have explained
the phenomenon of men feeling more comfortable than women in the formalistic
style of law).
5. See Cathleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational
Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 667, 676
(1994) (stating that isolation affects students who might naturally be thought to drift
outside the realm of the traditional majority law student). See also Ruta K. Stropus,
Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the
21st Century, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 462-65 (1996) (discussing how nontradi-
tional law students, which includes females, are more likely than traditional students
to be isolated from formal and informal networks that can help nontraditional law
students understand and ultimately master the law school environment).
6. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes
to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DIcc. L. REv. 7, 16-20 (1998)
(discussing the consequences that result from the muting of outsider voices).
7. See Stanchi, supra note 6, at 17.
8. See generally Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein & Katherine Austin Stalcup, Te(a)chnology:
Web-Based Instruction in Legal Skills Courses, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 482-91 (1999).
The authors explore various learning style theories including- The Learning Style In-
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easily adapted to the Socratic case method,9 the standard bluebook
exam, 10 and the hierarchical competitive nature of law school." Underly-
ing many of these criticisms is the explicit and implicit assumption that
female law students struggle with law school's preoccupation with nor-
mative notions of logic and reason.12
This paper, focusing exclusively on gender, asks whether male and
female law students express different preferences for logic-based learning
models. A wide variety of educational theories and other theories have
been used to conceptualize different learning preferences among law
students3 but until now, none has focused on logical intelligence com-
pared with the other intelligences. Using Harvard educational
psychologist Howard Gardner's theory of Multiple Intelligences, this
paper describes an empirical study establishing that male and female law
students express differences in preferring logical intelligence over the
other intelligences. This paper introduces the concept of "functional
discrimination," addressing the ways in which law school functionally
discriminates against women by significantly favoring logical intelli-
gence. Law School functionally discriminates against women (1) by not
providing women access to the prime benefits of the institution and
ventory, created by Rita and Kenneth Dunn; Right Brain/Left Brain Theories, de-
scribed by Linda Verlee Williams; The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, developed by
Katherine Briggs and her daughter, Isabel Briggs Myers; Auditory, Visual, and Tactile
Learners, categorized by Lynne Celli Sarasin; The Theory of Multiple Intelligences,
developed by Howard Gardner; and Adult Learning Theory, chiefly proposed by
Malcom S. Knowles.
9. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 462-65 (discussing how scholars argue that nontradi-
tional students perceive the Langdellian method as reflecting "white male values,
created for those who are assertive, argumentative, confrontational, controlling, im-
personal, logical, and abstract").
10. See Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. Ray. 433, 456-57
(1989) (describing how the discourse of Blue Book examinations is predominantly a
masculine discourse, which employs values, techniques, and concepts that are more
widely known among men than women). See also Torrey, supra note 2, at 288 (stat-
ing that law school examinations "tend to better evaluate responses to time pressure,
individualist merit, and reasoning (considered by many to be male-dominated traits)
and less well at evaluating creativity, nurturance, and motivation (considered by
many to be female-dominated traits)").
11. See GUINIER Er Al., supra note 2, at 62 (discussing how a significant number of
women learn their place at the bottom of the gender hierarchy based on the "combi-
nation of highly visible, competitive pedagogical strategies in large first-year
classrooms, peer hazing, and an institutionalized emphasis on replacing 'emotions'
with 'logic' and 'commitments' with 'neutrality' may be sufficient to socialize many
students into their 'place,' even those who are trying to resist").
12. See GUINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 59-62.
13. See Zanglein & Stalcup, supra note 8, at 482-91.
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only rewarding those adept at logical intelligence; (2) by not offering
women a pedagogy with diverse materials and approaches based on all
of the intelligences; and (3) by making women feel that they have not
had an impact on the institution because it has not evolved to reflect the
diversity of intelligences that are in the legal community and required of
the legal community.
I. THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
In Gardner's seminal work Frames of Mind, 4 he challenges the tra-
ditional view that intelligence is a "single faculty" so that a person is
"'smart' or 'stupid' across the board."' Defining "intelligence" as a bi-
opsychological potential to process information," 6 Gardner identifies
several different kinds of cognitive intelligences including: Logi-
cal/Mathematical Intelligence ("logical"), Verbal/Linguistic Intelligence
("linguistic"), Visual/Spatial ("spatial") Intelligence, Interpersonal Intel-
ligence, and Intrapersonal Intelligence.17 Logical Intelligence is the
capacity "to calculate, quantify, [and] consider propositions and hy-
potheses .... ,,1 Linguistic intelligence is the capacity "to think in
words and to use language to express and appreciate complex mean-
ings."' 9 Spatial intelligence is the capacity "to perceive external and
internal imagery, to recreate, transform, or modify images, to navigate
oneself and objects through space, and to produce or decode graphic
information." 20 Interpersonal intelligence is the capacity "to understand
and interact effectively with others."21 Intrapersonal Intelligence is the
capacity "to construct an accurate perception of oneself....
14. HowARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
(10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND].
15. HowARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE
21sT CENTURY 34 (1999) [hereinafter GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED].
16. GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 33-34.
17. GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 41-43. Gardner also recog-
nizes Bodily-Kinesthetic Intelligence, see GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra
note 15, at 42, 95-96, and Musical Intelligence, see GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE RE-
FRAMED, supra note 15, at 103-04. However, these two Intelligences are not relevant
to this examination of legal education.
18. Linda Campbell et al., TEACHING AND LEARNING THROUGH MULTIPLE INTELLIGEN-
cEs i, xvi (2d ed. 1999) (describing briefly the intelligences postulated by Gardner).
19. Campbell et al., supra note 18, at xvi.
20. Campbell et al., supra note 18, at xvi.
21. Campbell et al., supra note 18, at xvi.
22. Campbell et al., supra note 18, at xvi.
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While legal practitioners draw upon many of these intelligences, 2
law school narrowly concentrates on Logical Intelligence.
A. Logical Intelligence
Traditional schooling, traditional intelligence testing, and most
standardized tests are written for and reward Logical thinking.2 Logical
intelligence involves the capacity to formulate and apply abstract rules,
25
use long chains of reasoning to develop theories,26 and understand and
articulate logical patterns.27 These are key skills for anyone who works
with appellate decisions on a regular basis (e.g. the appellate lawyer and
the 1st-year law student). Appellate lawyers, judges, and law clerks use
Logical Intelligence to extract abstract legal holdings from appellate de-
cisions, apply them to new fact patterns, and make reasoned arguments
to justify rulings. The first-year law student spends much of her time
doing these same things. Law school uses this logical realm of the appel-
late decision to teach and evaluate.
1. Socratic Case Method
Most first year law students learn using the Socratic Case Method. s
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School in the
late 1800s, developed the Socratic Case Method.29 Dissatisfied with the
apprenticeship model of legal education, Langdell wanted to "institu-
tionalize"30 legal education to become more academic than skill
23. Gardner is also postulating Naturalist Intelligence, see Campbell et al., supra note 18,
at 48-52, and Moral Intelligence, see Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 66-67.
24. See GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 41. Gardner notes that
Linguistic Intelligence has also been valued in traditional education but does not
comment on postgraduate education. This paper argues that legal education is fo-
cused primarily on Logical Intelligence and therefore those who may have done well
in traditional educational environments may not do as well in law school due to their
linguistic intelligence.
25. See GARDNER, FRAiEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 135.
26. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 137.
27. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 135.
28. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 456 (noting that the Socratic Case Method remains the
predominant teaching methodology used in law schools today for doctrinal courses).
29. See Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical Education at
Yale Law School 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 505-06 (1999) (examining the develop-
ment of Langdell's Socratic Case Method).
30. See Holland, supra note 29, at 505-06.
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oriented.31 Langdell's Socratic Case Method, formerly known as the
"Harvard Method," 32 required students to learn by reading appellate
decisions, answering questions about the holding and reasoning of those
appellate decisions, and applying the rules of those appellate decisions to
new fact patterns.3 By focusing on abstract legal principles from the
appellate cases, Langdell purposefully emphasized Logical Intelligence
and rejected most of the other intelligences.! The Socratic Case Method
has been criticized for being too logical because it is "overly formalistic
and theoretical,"35 "confined to cold legal reasoning,"" "a legal sci-
ence,"37 and "analysis in a vacuum., 38 Even though very few law students
will practice appellate law after graduation, Langdell's Socratic Case
Method is the predominant teaching methodology used in law schools
39
today for doctrinal courses.
2. Examinations
In addition to teaching, most law schools emphasize logical intelli-
gence in the evaluation of students as well. Many first-year courses
evaluate students using standard bluebook examinations."' These timed
tests require students to "issue spot" and apply the holdings of appellate
decisions from their case books to a complex set of facts and to use the
logic of precedential reasoning to predict possible legal outcomes." This
logical testing has been criticized for ignoring the importance of creative
31. See Holland, supra note 29, at 505-06; Stropus, supra note 5, at 452.
32. See Holland, supra note 29, at 505-06.
33. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 452-53.
34. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 453.
35. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 456.
36. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 461.
37. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 452.
38. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 461.
39. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 456.
40. Kissam, supra note 10, at 437-40 (discussing the many different examination prob-
lems employed, including- the classic "issue spotter" essay question; advocacy
questions that invite a more deliberate construction of complex arguments; various
sorts of short-answer questions that test for issue identification, rules specification, or
rule application; and questions that ask students to evaluate different aspects of legal
doctrine). See also Paula Lustbader, Principle 7. Good Practice Respects Diverse Talents
and Ways ofLearning, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 448, 455 (1999) (stating that the majority
of law schools emphasize and measure only the logical intelligence).
41. Kissam, supra note 10, at 440.
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synthesis and "legal imagination,"4
2 disregarding "practical judgments,"
4 3
and "not adequately reflect[ing] all the types of intelligence that the suc-
cessfil lawyer needs., 4 4 While ignored by a significant proportion of law
school education, particularly the first-year courses,45 the other intelli-
gences are integral to the varied and multifaceted roles of lawyering.
B. Linguistic Intelligence
Broadly, linguistic intelligence involves "sensitivity to spoken and
written languages, the ability to learn languages, and the capacity to use
language to accomplish certain goals."" Gardner explains that linguistic
intelligence can be rhetorical, mnemonic, explanatory, or metalinguis-
tic.47 Each of these characteristics corresponds to important attorney
roles.
The rhetorical verbal-linguist is aware of the different functions of
language as used in different contexts and how it may excite, stimulate,
convey, and convince." For example, the attorney litigator, lobbyist, or
politician strategically may use language for these purposes. The mne-
monic verbal-linguist uses language to remember information and is
sensitive to word choice.50 A transactional attorney displays these skills
when drafting, negotiating, and interpreting real estate, corporate, and
other documents. The explanatory aspect of linguistic intelligence is the
ability to use language to teach.5 Lawyers are often described as "teach-
ers"52 when they use language to "educate" non-lawyers including
42. See Philip N. Meyer, "Fingers Pointing at the Moon:" New Perspectives on Teaching
Legal Writing andAnalysis, 25 CONN. L. REv. 777, 781 (1993).
43. Kissam, supra note 10, at 441.
44. Lustbader, supra note 40, at 455 (discussing how effective teachers "find ways to
teach and evaluate a broader range of intelligences, and they encourage their students
to master more than one type").
45. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 480-81 (discussing how the main doctrinal courses tend
to emphasize logical intelligence, while some of the practical skills training courses
tend to incorporate the other intelligences).
46. GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 41.
47. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 78.
48. See GARDNER, FRAMsS OF MIND, supra note 14, at 77-78.
49. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 78.
50. See GARDNER, FRAmEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 75.
51. See GARDNER, FRaMES OF MIND, supra note 14, at 78.
52. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role of Education in Lawyering,
4 CLINICAL L. Ray. 359, 360-61 (1998) (describing how "the lawyer serves as the in-
termediary between the legal system and the consumers of that system, the clients,
often trying to make the law meaningful"). Kovach contends that awareness of the
2002]
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clients, juries, and other parties about complex legal issues.53 Linguistic
Intelligence also includes what Gardner calls "metalinhuisic analysis"-
the "ability to use language to reflect upon language" and a sensitivity
to the meaning of words and what they imply.55 A lawyer or judge dem-
onstrates this linguistic intelligence when using the canons of
construction to draft, interpret, and make arguments about language
and its implications as used in a contract, statute, or other legal docu-
ment. A litigator or negotiator uses her emotional experience to choose
words that have favorable connotations for her client's interests. For ex-
ample, attorneys on different sides may use word connotations to
describe a domestic violence episode in very different ways. While the
defense attorney might reluctantly concede that the "his overworked
client might have been a bit rough when confronting his wife about her
adulterous affair," the prosecuting attorney speaks of the "vicious, cruel
way in which the defendant punched his small, frail wife in the mouth,
knocking out two teeth." Both attorneys use the emotional images trig-
gered by language to emphasize and de-emphasize facts favorable to the
respective parties.
C. Visual-Spatial Intelligence
Visual-spatial intelligence includes the ability to perceive and ma-
nipulate forms,56 use graphic manipulation symbolically, 7 and discern
similarities across diverse domains." The ability to perceive and ma-
nipulate forms requires appreciating how that form will be viewed from
different angles.59 A patent attorney uses this ability to understand her
client's product or technology. Likewise, a prosecutor or personal injury
attorney uses this ability to understand complex forensic evidence.
lawyer's educator role should begin-and develop--in law school. See also Gail A.
Janquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind Modifying What It
Means to "Think Like a Lawyer", 45 STANl. L. Rav. 1713, 1715 (1993) (contending
that lawyer "habits of mind, thinking in an abstract hypothetical-deductive style, of-
ten result in communication to nonlawyers that is deficient"). The authors argue that
to better serve their clients, lawyers should view themselves as "educators and tailor
their client communications accordingly."
53. See Kovach, supra note 52, at 360-61; Janquish & Ware, supra note 52, at 1715.
54. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 78.
55. See GARDNER, FRAmas OF MIND, supra note 14, at 77.
56. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 174.
57. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 175-77.
58. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 174.
59. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 174.
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The ability to symbolically use graphic manipulation involves the
"capacity to produce a grahic likeness of spatial information" such as
maps, diagrams, or charts. A trial attorney uses this ability to create
visual aids to explain complex scientific evidence to a lay jury. The abil-
ity to discern similarities across diverse domains involves the use of
metaphor and the ability to perceive patterns. 6' An attorney uses meta-
phor to help a jury or client understand complex information by
relating it to something the jury already knows. Likewise an attorney
1 62must also be able to perceive patterns. Like a master chess player, an
attorney uses visual/spatial intelligence to "relate a perceived pattern to
past patterns, and to develop the present position into an overall game
plan."63
D. InterpersonalAnd lntrapersonal ntelligences
An effective attorney knows other people and herself. The former is
interpersonal intelligence and the latter is intrapersonal intelligence. In-
terpersonal intelligence is the "capacity to understand and make
distinctions between the intentions, motivations, and desires of other
people."" It also includes the ability to counsel and nurture, work well
with others,65 and influence a disparate group.6 A lawyer uses interper-
sonal intelligence to interact with clients, judges, adversaries, witnesses,
experts, and law enforcement. The lawyer relies on interpersonal intel-
ligence to be an effective counselor who communicates, listens, and
empathizes with a client.68 A lawyer then uses interpersonal intelligence
60. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 176.
61. See GARDNER, FRAMEs OF MIND, supra note 14, at 176.
62. Cf GARDNER, F.Ahms OF MIND, supra note 14, at 192-95 (illustrating the use of
visual-spatial intelligence to strategize by examining master chess players).
63. See GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 14, at 192-95.
64. GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 43.
65. See GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 43.
66. GARDNER, FRAms OF MIND, supra note 14, at 239.
67. See Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 59-61
(1992) (describing how good "lawyers should have good interactive skills-
communicating, listening, sensitivity, empathy").
68. Schultz, supra note 67, at 61; John Sonsteng, Learning By Doing: Preparing Law Stu-
dentsfor the Practice ofLaw, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 111, 112-14 (1995) (citing
the ten "Fundamental Lawyering Skills" from the MacCrate Report, which included
the following- problem solving legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; factual in-
vestigation; communication; counseling; negotiation; litigation and alternative
dispute resolution procedures; organization and management of legal work; and rec-
ognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas).
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to negotiate, mediate, persuade and otherwise advance her client's inter-
ests.
Intrapersonal intelligence is the capacity to understand oneself and
to use such information to "effectively regulate one's life."69 A lawyer
must use this intrapersonal intelligence and listen to her conscience as
she has a "unique responsibility to be ethical." 0
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE PREFERENCE
AND GENDER CORRELATION
A. Kaufinan Study
This study was conducted to determine whether male and female
law students express differences in preferring logical intelligence over the
other Gardner intelligences. This study is novel in using Gardner's con-
ceptualization of multiple intelligences to explore gender differences
with respect to preference for logic-based learning models. Because
Gardner describes different kinds of intelligences, there was an opportu-
nity to see if the female students preferred a different kind of
intelligence, instead of merely confirming that the female students were
not comfortable with logical intelligence. The hypothesis was that the
male students would be significantly more comfortable with logical in-
telligence than the female students and that the female students would
be significantly more comfortable with another intelligence such as in-
terpersonal intelligence.
B. Procedure
The participants were randomly selected and consisted of first, sec-
ond and third-year law students. Each of the 450 participants completed
a one-page questionnaire. The author of this paper developed the ques-
tionnaire and supervised her research assistants in scoring it. Subjects
were informed that participation was voluntary.
The questionnaire asked for the participant's demographic infor-
mation including: age, race, year in law school, gender, undergraduate
major, and full or part-time status. Directly beneath the demographic
section, the questionnaire asked the participant to select from a list of 25
69. GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 15, at 43.
70. Schultz, supra note 67, at 59-61; See also Sonsteng, supra note 68, at 112.
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words and 25 phrases describing various personal characteristics that
"best describe" them. Each of the characteristics pertained to one of
Gardner's five Multiple Intelligences.
Participants' selections were categorized so that each received a
logical score, linguistic score, visual score, interpersonal score, and in-
trapersonal score. Each score signified how many times a participant
chose a logical preference, a linguistic preference, an interpersonal pref-
erence, an intrapersonal preference, or a visual preference. For example,
the questionnaire received a logical score of 2 (choosing "logical" and
"rational"); a linguistic score of 2 (choosing "grammatical" and "listen-
ing for the connotations"); an interpersonal score of 2 (choosing
"sociable" and "voicing concerns"); an intrapersonal score of 2 (choos-
ing "instinctive" and "assessing own work") and a visual score of 2
(choosing "maps & diagrams" and "seeing big picture"). Although vis-
ual/spatial, logical, linguistic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal
intelligences were all observed during the investigation, the researchers
found that the most statistically significant results came from the logical
and linguistic intelligences as a function of gender.
C. StatisticalAnalysis
Demographic data were analyzed using analysis of variance
(ANOVA) and the chi-square test. Comparisons were made between
and among groups based on demographic categories. Comparisons in all
groups were considered to be significant with probability values (P), P <
0.05. A principle components factor analysis with one-way ANOVA
was run on the total pool of survey scores. Normally distributed data are
presented as the Mean and Standard Deviation ("SD") in each category.
The Mean is the average score for the category. The Standard Deviation
is a number that reflects how the distribution of scores is centered
around the Mean. The primary statistical analysis tool used was Statis-
tica@ software.
D. Results
The results are striking. The most notable results showed that male
law students significantly selected logical intelligence more than female
law students and that female law students significantly selected linguistic
intelligence more than male law students (See Table 1). Female students
significantly selected linguistic intelligence more than male law students.
2002]
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For linguistic intelligence, female students displayed a Mean of 1.55
with a Standard Deviation of.25, while male students displayed a Mean
of 1.12 with a Standard Deviation of.08 (See Fig. 1). Out of the possi-
ble 5 points for each category, the results indicated the following: For
Logical Intelligence, male students displayed a Mean of 2.42 with a
Standard Deviation of .81, while female students displayed a Mean of
1.82 with a Standard Deviation of = .47 (See Fig. 2). When placing the
charts next to each other, an inverse mirror effect is revealed so that the
men selected logical attributes to describe themselves almost as often as
the women selected linguistic attributes to describe themselves. This
occurs at every level of student. The first-year male students selected
logical characteristics (Mean = 2.59, Standard Deviation = .88) almost
as much as the first-year female students selected linguistic characteris-
tics (Mean = 1.64, Standard Deviation = .33) (See Fig. 3). The upper-
level male students selected logical qualities (Mean = 2.17, Standard
Deviation = .74) almost as often as the upper-level female students se-
lected linguistic qualities (Mean = 1.44, Standard Deviation = .16) (See
Fig. 4). All other observed categories yielded insignificant results and
were therefore omitted.
TABLE I
LINGUISTIC AND LOGICAL INTELLIGENCE SCORES By GENDER
LINGUISTIC INTELLIGENCE LOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
All Female 1.55 .25 1.12 .08
Students
All Male 1.82 .47 2.42 .81
Students
First-Year 1.64 .33 1.77 .36
Female
Students
First-Year 1.1 .033 2.59 .88
Male Students
Upper-Level 1.44 .16 1.89 .63
Female
Students
Upper-Level 1.29 .29 2.17 .74
Male Students
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FIGURE I
Gender as a Function of Unguistic Intelligence
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FIGURE 4
2L Gender as a Function of Unguistic Intelligence
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III. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Functional Discrimination
Even though women students with "other intelligences" are admit-
ted in the law school door, they experience functional discrimination.
While "Functional Discrimination" is a concept developed in this paper,
the name was inspired by Lani Guinier who urges legal educators to re-
think conventional norms "by reconsidering the fairness and
finctionality of an educational culture that trains, teaches, [and] evalu-
ates everyone using a one-size-fits-all approach.... ,,71 similarly, Susan P.
Sturm queries, "Does [the role that law school is preparing graduates to
serve] equip graduates to FUNCTION productively and constructively as
citizens of both the profession and the community?" 72 She answers, "It
may be that the profession has diversified to the point that no single,
central, organizing paradigm will be adequate. At the least, the overarch-
ing concept of professionalism may need to be one that is inclusive, if
not integrative, of a variety of roles andfinctions."73
Therefore, this paper argues that functional discrimination occurs
when law schools:
1. Do not provide women access to the prime benefits of the
institution by only rewarding those comfortable with
logical intelligence;
2. Does not offer women a pedagogy with diverse materials
and approaches based on all of the intelligences;
3. Does not make women feel that they have had an impact
on the institution by not evolving to reflect the diversity
of intelligences that are in the law school community as
well as the professional community.
1. Logical Intelligence Bias
Law school commits functional discrimination because it does not
give women students access to the prime benefits of the institution. Law
71. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
72. Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About
Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 119,
126 (1997).
73. Sturm, supra note 72, at 135 (emphasis added).
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school creates an artificial hierarchy of intelligences that unfairly rewards
those traditional students who think with logical intelligence at the ex-
pense of those nontraditional students who think with other
intelligences. As Guinier has said, "Law school valorizes sorting ... but
[does] not necessarily develop each student's true potential."74
Indeed, law school grades in the first year are mostly based on blue
book exams that test logical intelligence alone.75 Moreover, students
who do well on these first-year exams have access to prestigious extra-
curricular activities such as Law Review.76 These students also have
better employment prospects at more impressive law firms, with high-
level government agencies, and for prestigious judicial clerkships. 7
Therefore, this class ranking based on first-year logical intelligence can
significantly impact a student's career. 78 For these reasons, grades and
the benefits received from good grades need to be more "democratic"
79
to reflect the diversity of intelligences among law students as well as the
diversity of intelligences required in the legal profession.
2. Inflexible Legal Pedagogy
Many law schools do not offer women students a diverse peda-
gogy.8 As discussed above, the Socratic Case Method emphasizes logical
intelligence at the expense of other important perspectives. Not only
would non-traditional students benefit from a multiple intelligence per-
spective, but all students in the law school class would benefit as well.
3. Diversity of Intelligences Ignored
Diversity adds to the educational experience of law school by bring-
ing together people of various backgrounds, life experiences,"' and kinds
of intelligences. Individual students come to law school with "their own
74. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
75. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 439.
76. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 463.
77. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 462-66.
78. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 463-65.
79. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 463.
80. See Stropus, supra note 5, at 456 (noting that the Socratic Case Method remains the
predominant teaching methodology used in law schools today for doctrinal courses).
81. Garner C Weng, Look at the Pretty Colors! Rethinking Promises of Diversity as Legally
Binding, 10 LA RAzA LJ. 753, 763-65 (1998).
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distinct beliefs, ideas, biases, fears," 2 and intelligences. Surrounding
themselves with students of different backgrounds who may have differ-
ent kinds of intelligences enables them to grow and develop so that they
can overcome their erroneous misconceptions and acquire the depth
they will need to be effective attorneys who can use other intelligences
besides logical intelligence. The whole class benefits when a case is
taught from a multiple intelligence perspective.
4. Multiple Intelligence Method Case Analysis
Consider Judge Posner's opinion in the case of Susan Wassell v.
Wilbur and Florena Adams from a multiple intelligence perspective.83
From a logical perspective, the "relevant" facts of this case are as follows:
The plaintiff stayed in a motel owned by the defendants; plaintiff volun-
tarily opened the door at 1:00 am without looking through a glass
window and was raped; plaintiff did have an opportunity to escape the
room when the rapist was in the shower; defendants never warned plain-
tiff that there had been one rape and two robberies at the motel in the
last seven years; and defendants did not employ a security guard at the
motel or put a telephone in the motel room. The jury found the defen-
dants three percent negligent and the plaintiff ninety-seven percent
negligent and therefore awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages.
Plaintiff then asked the trial judge to set aside the verdict because the
defendants had been willful and wanton in their conduct, and thus,
plaintiffs negligence was irrelevant. The court held that defendants' ac-
tions were not willful and wanton because they did not consciously
disregard a high probability of harm. 4
From a logical perspective, this may be a somewhat interesting case
about contributory negligence, but it becomes much more interesting
when examining it from a multiple intelligence perspective. From a lin-
guistic viewpoint, Posner's word choice provides a fascinating insight
into his own biases. For example in the opinion, he describes the rapist
as "a respectably dressed black man" 5 although he does not mention the
race of the other parties. In disclosing the rapist's race when it is not
relevant to the issue of the case, Posner perpetuates the stereotype of the
black man as a violent criminal, as unrespectable, and as poor. An in-
82. Weng, supra note 81, at 764.
83. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989). The author acknowledges Jim Col-
liton for suggesting the use of this case.
84. Wassell 865 F.2d at 854.
85. Wassell 865 F.2d at 851.
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class linguistic analysis of Posner's language would illuminate the con-
scious and unconscious biases jurists, professors, and students may bring
to their legal analyses as well.
From an interpersonal perspective, this case is fascinating as well.
Posner engages in pseudo-psychoanalysis of the plaintiff in the very first
line of the decision. The opinion opens with the following description
of the plaintiff:
The plaintiff, born Susan Marisconish, grew up on Macaroni
Street in a small town in a poor coal-mining region of Penn-
sylvania-a town so small and so obscure that it has no name.
She was the ninth of ten children, and as a child was sexually
abused by her stepfather.
86
Right from the beginning, Posner gives the impression that the
plaintiff is unsophisticated, provincial, and tainted by past abuse. What
is Posner's purpose in including this information? It is not relevant to
whether the defendants' actions were wanton and willful based on the
probability of harm. If anything, Posner's revelations create a psycho-
logical portrait of the plaintiff as a naive hysterical victim, minimizing
the actions of the rapist and the motel owners. The anger that students
might feel toward Posner for stereotyping the plaintiff, as well as the
rapist, can be expressed by considering the case from an intrapersonal
perspective.
B. Linguistic Intelligence Undercuts Logical Intelligence
In an ideal law school setting, the more "male" logician and the
more "female" linguist would complement and learn from each other.
After all, both intelligences are integral for success as an attorney. Unfor-
tunately in our law schools, the logician and the linguist are often at
odds with one another. In fact, those characteristics that make one a
talented linguist might actually make it difficult to succeed in the logical
world of law school.
The linguist uses context to understand the meaning of language;
the logician, on the other hand, dissects a principle from its context,
removing it to the realm of the abstract. The Socratic Case Method and
the issue-spotting bluebook examination emphasize and reward abstract
86. Wassel 865 F.2d at 850.
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thinking. 7 However, the linguistic thinker uses her own emotional ex-
perience to understand the various subtleties and connotations of
language choices. In comparison, the logician focuses on abstract prin-
ciples in distant objective ways. Finally, the linguist connects and relates
ideas and meanings while the logician places information into discrete
categories with clear boundaries. The logical pedagogy of law school
requires students to create myriad discrete categories of information
based on causes of action, elements, rules, exceptions, etc.88 The linguis-
tic student who finds connection and difference among many things
will have a hard time reining in her divergent thinking to en-
force/conform to those rigid boundaries.
C Alienation and Muting
Many women feel alienated from a law school that does not recog-
nize their linguistic capabilities. For example, women studied at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Yale Law School expressed
profound alienation from a narrowly logical pedagogy that devalues and
penalizes the linguistic concerns of empathy, relational logic, social con-
text, plurality of interests and circumstantial justifications." According
to Muting Theory,0 this alienation comes from the dominant logical
discourse creating and controlling women's law school experiences in a
way that is inauthentic for them because it does not include their way of
thinking.91 Law school's preference for logical discourse and the "imper-
fect fit"92 between language and experience lead to muting of women in
the following ways: (1) women "may be viewed as 'inarticulate' [in the
classroom] because of their inability to express themselves using the
dominant language; 9" (2) women may be silent about matters which
87. Kissam, supra note 10, at 440-41.
88. See Kissam, supra note 10, at 440-41.
89. See GUINIER ET AL., supra note 2, 66-67. See also Suzanne Home & Lois Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 9-10 (1989) (citing the Yale study which found that the content of
legal education "devalues factors important to women, such as social context, plural-
ity of interests, or circumstantial and/or economic justification for people's actions").
90. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that "[tlhe term 'muting' originated with Edwin
and Shirley Arderer, social anthropologists who, in the 1970s, began to examine how
social anthropology had ignored women and their voices").
91. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 22-23 (noting how legal writing pedagogy leaves little room
for personal definitions of context, or the development of a personal, authentic
voice).
92. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 19.
93. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 19.
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concern them because there is no mode of expression in the dominant
logical model;9 and (3) "the existence of a dominant [logical discourse]
and the requirement that an individual [engage] in it ... mean[s]that
alternative methods of expression will be suppressed or inhibited."95
Linguistic intelligence, like language in Stanchi's description of muting
theory, may be inhibited if women are viewed as inarticulate in the So-
cratic classroom when they express themselves emphasizing linguistic
characteristics differing from the dominant logical model. Moreover,
women may be silent about linguistic matters that concern them be-
cause there is no mode of expression for them in the dominant logical
model.
Thus, if women are required to engage in the dominant logical dis-
course, alternative intelligences, such as linguistic intelligence, will
continue to be suppressed or inhibited. Talking to colleagues about this
paper revealed many examples of this kind of muting. One colleague
told me that her criminal law professor silenced her when she said she
felt "uncomfortable talking about rape as a sex crime." Another col-
league told me the professor rolled his eyes when she spoke of her
personal experiences as an adoptee. A third colleague told me that she
never participated in class after being reprimanded by a professor be-
cause she requested that he refer to the female students as "women"
rather than "gals."
CONCLUSION
The lawyer of the twenty-first century is basically a problem
solver.9  According to the MacCrate Report, a lawyer needs to be able to
identify and diagnose a problem, generate alternative solutions and
strategies, develop a plan of action, implement the plan, and keep the
planning process open to new ideas.97 As Susan Sturm has observed,
"The view of lawyer as problem solver builds on the idea of pluralistic
praxis: the need to employ multiple skills and mobilize various kinds of
knowledge to solve problems.""
As a problem solver, the attorney must think with multiple intelli-
gences and learn from other intelligences in order to generate
94. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 19.
95. Stanchi, supra note 6, at 19.
96. GUINIER L-r An-, supra note 2, at 15.
97. See Sonsteng, supra note 68, at 112-13 n.3.
98. See Sturm, supra note 72, at 136-37.
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ccomprehensive and adaptive responses to complex problems.""' The
proliferation of information technology and economic globalization re-
quire the broad acquisition of knowledge, theory, and skills."o0 As
business and social communities grow and diversify, the lawyer is in-
creasingly called upon to be the multicultural expert who herself must
be open to and versed in multiple perspectives and multiple intelligen-
ces.
To accomplish these goals and train multifaceted lawyers, law
schools need to functionally diversify. Functional diversity is so much
more than increasing admission statistics. Functional diversity requires
law schools to not only admit women, but to accommodate and change
as a result of their admission. This symbiotic adaptation benefits the
women students by including a diverse pedagogy from which they can
learn from and feel comfortable. This adaptation benefits the men stu-
dents who may be learning new skills that they need in order to be more
effective attorneys. This adaptation benefits the legal community that
needs versatile problem-solving professionals. Thus, it should not be
logician versus linguist as adversaries. Rather, the legal academy should
encourage logician and linguist as collaborators, colleagues, and
friends. t
99. Sturm, supra note 72, at 143.
100. Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacRate Report-Heuristic or Prescriptive?, 69 WAsH.
L. REv. 505, 512 (1994) (stating that "[wihat we teach and how we teach it depends
on each school's vision of the profession and of the world of tomorrow-a fin-de-
sikde vision that takes into account current and anticipated trends in society, the bar,
and scholarship, as well as fiscal retrenchment, the implications of information tech-
nology, the context of economic globalization, ethical preoccupations, and
interdisciplinary, critical, and multicultural perspectives").
101. See Sturm, supra note 72, at 133-35.
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